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Why a World State is Unavoidable in Planetary Defense: On Loopholes 
in the Vision of a Cosmopolitan Governance1 
Pavel Dufek 
1.1. Introduction 
The idea of global planetary defense against threats from outer space (hereinafter also PD), as 
explored in previous chapters, requires an effective global decision-making system that would 
both implement the necessary technology (or oversee its implementation) and deploy it in case 
of emergency. The proposal (Chapter XXX) is based on the assumption that such a political body 
would be “semi-cosmopolitan”, i.e. short of a full-fledged global political authority – a “world-
state” – represented by a world government, although it implies “more centralized [global] 
power(s)”. The main claim of this chapter is that planetary defense against asteroids, as 
variously envisioned in the chapters in this book, cannot be implemented under such a model of 
democratic global governance. All relevant indices point to the necessity of establishing a global 
political authority with legitimate coercive powers, one that retains basic elements of statehood, 
which is a similar argument to the one I explored in some detail in an earlier paper on global 
justice.2 However, it remains to be seen whether such a political system can be in any 
recognizable sense democratic. Put bluntly, I find it unconvincing that planetary-wide, physical-
threat, all-comprehensive macrosecuritisation3 (“planet-wide securitizations”, as labelled in 
Chapter XXX), coupled with deep transformations of international law, global centralization of 
core decision-making powers, de-stigmatization of nuclear weapons, and the like, can proceed, 
succeed, and be implemented in a non-hierarchical international system where PD constitutes 
only one regime among many and states basically remain the major actors – sovereign 
principals. This is the main sense in which proposals in support of a semi-cosmopolitan model of 
global governance driven by cosmopolitan ethics, as discussed in Chapter XXX, are too idealistic. 
My field of expertise is political theory/philosophy and political science, and I believe this 
background allows me to spot important conceptual, normative and institutional hurdles which 
await any such extremely ambitious project with clear political ramifications. On a lower level of 
generality, the present chapter therefore provides an exposition of a number of important issues 
which I believe need to be seriously reflected upon also by advocates of planetary defense if 
their case is to be robust, persuasive, and ultimately successful as regards implementation of an 
enormously politically sensitive planetary defense policy. Although rationally and scientifically 
robust, the PD project suffers, in my view, from excessive simplification as well as naivety with 
respect to how both international and domestic politics works – especially if the resulting model 
of governance is to be democratic. It is impossible, I surmise, to insulate the scientific enterprise 
from the broader societal context within which it operates, and which it aims to transform. 
It needs to be stressed that mine is neither a critique nor a glorification of the idea of a world 
state/world government, understood as a model of political-decision-making on the global level; 
                                                                        
1 The text is an output of a research project supported by the Czech Science Foundation (code GA16-
13980S). I thank Nikola Schmidt for many suggestions regarding the shape of my argument, as well as for 
heated debates, both past and future, about real and imaginary limits to idealistic visions of global 
governance. 
2 Pavel Dufek, “Why Strong Moral Cosmopolitanism Requires a World-State,” International Theory 5, no. 2 
(2013): 177–212, doi:10.1017/S1752971913000171. 
3 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, “Macrosecuritization and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale in 
Securitization Theory,” Review of International Studies 35, no. April 2009 (2009): 253–76, 
doi:10.1017/S0260210509008511. 
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in this regard I remain agnostic.4 What  I am arguing is that in case of PD (and arguably other 
global-scale issues as well), effective, stable and legitimate solution cannot be based on the 
seemingly attractive yet vague and ultimately unworkable idea of “global governance without 
government” – that is, exercise of functions normally entrusted to state governments, such as 
dealing with political, economic, environmental etc. problems, without any such formal 
governmental body in place. “Government” would be replaced by a multi-level network of 
cooperating actors, bodies, and agencies.5 Defenders of such a vision of PD make their own case 
even more difficult by insisting on a democratic character of the global decision-making 
framework, which activates further problems of conceptual, normative, and institutional kind.6 
For clarity purposes, I divide the issues into five broad groups – law, politics, identity and 
society, economics, and meta-theory. As will become clear, the respective points are not strictly 
separated and often overlap, to the effect that a problematic feature in the realm of law and 
legislation affects – one might say infects – the circumstances of political action, as do 
unresolved issues of national, global, or regional identities. Other combinations are of course 
possible as well. I will not waste much space on rehearsing the arguments developed in more 
detail below; let me only indicate they include claims from instability; efficiency; power politics; 
collective action problems; conflicts among political issues; democratic legitimacy; and common 
identity. 
The main message of the chapter could be summed up in the following way: If PD is a good idea 
and a desirable goal, which it very well might be, then we should be honest with ourselves and 
avoid wanting to have the cake and eat it at the same time, because not all good things go 
together in planetary defense endeavors.7 
1.2. Law and Politics 
 
Let me start with the realm of law, especially, even if not exclusively, international law. It 
sometimes gets lost on us that modern democratic politics, and the modern state as such, are 
fundamentally intertwined with modern law: In a sense, the modern state is first and foremost a 
legal state, which means that political decisions have to be promulgated and implemented 
strictly in the form of a legal norm, be it constitutional laws, regular laws, or subordinate 
legislation. The rationale behind the primacy of law – we usually speak of the rule of law, the 
Rechtsstaat, or the prééminence du droit – is to prevent unchecked discretion of the rulers, as 
well as to stabilize legal expectations and ensure legal certainty.8 From this follows the 
                                                                        
4 For a recent discussion of the desirability of a world-statist solution to global problems see Shmuel Nili, 
“Who’s Afraid of a World State? A Global Sovereign and the Statist-Cosmopolitan Debate,” Critical Review 
of International Social and Political Philosophy 18, no. 3 (May 4, 2015): 241–63, 
doi:10.1080/13698230.2013.850833. 
5 The classic here is 2.James Rosenau and Otto Czempiel, eds., Governance without Government: Order and 
Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Vambridge UP, 1992). See also James Rosenau, Study of World 
Politics, Volume II: Globalization and Governance (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2006). For a widely cited 
conceptual clarification see R. A. W. Rhodes, “The New Governance: Governing without Government,” 
Political Studies 44, no. 4 (September 29, 1996): 652–67, doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb01747.x. 
6 For an internal critique of how loosely the concept of global governance has been used in the study of 
international relations see Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson, “Rethinking Global Governance? 
Complexity, Authority, Power, Change,” International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 1 (2014): 207–15, 
doi:10.1111/isqu.12082. 
7 I am paraphrasing here the title of an important article on democracy promotion. See Sonja Grimm and 
Julia Leininger, “Not All Good Things Go Together: Conflicting Objectives in Democracy Promotion,” 
Democratization 19, no. 3 (2012): 391–414, doi:10.1080/13510347.2012.674355. 
8 Brian Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004); Danilo Zolo, “The Rule of Law: A Critical Reappraisal,” in The Rule of Law: History, Theory and 
Criticism, ed. Pietro Costa and Danilo Zolo (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 24. 
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paramount role of the judiciary, and less optimistically, the always-present tension between 
what the law in force requires versus what the ever-changing democratic will off the people 
wants. Although it is an open question how to approach law and legislation on the supranational 
level where there is no single source of legitimate legislation, it is an eminently important one. 
The absence of a legal framework both enabling and constraining the exercise of democratic 
politics makes room for the game of power politics, and this eventuality should be taken 
seriously by the PD community. 
1.2.1. Shared framework or fragmentation 
The guiding idea behind my argument then is that PD requires, or entails, an overarching 
legal framework shared and respected by all actors, as is the case with other global issues.9 This 
will require reconstruction, or transformation, of both domestic and international law in whose 
language will be PD-related policies formulated. Given that PD aims to transform both policy 
priorities across existing countries and symbolic and cultural self-understanding of the 
respective actors (governments, peoples, social groups, interest groups, individuals etc.), while 
providing for efficient global decision-making machinery, we cannot expect the extant body of 
international law to be sufficient for such a momentous shift. Empirically speaking, however, 
such preconditions are not there. 
Of course, certain changes in both domestic and international law have been taking 
place, as many observers and cosmopolitan-minded thinkers argue. However, the developments 
point rather to a continuing polycentering, pluralization, and fragmentation of the emerging 
“global law”, even though “sectoral constitutionalization” (unification within individual policy or 
issue areas) might be emerging simultaneously.10 This means that instead of a centrally 
promulgated, uniform, comprehensive system of law valid for each and every actor – as is the 
case with citizens of nation-states and their standing vis-à-vis domestic law11 – we observe the 
emergence of overlapping, criss-crossing, and not seldom conflicting bodies of legal regulations. 
This is (very briefly) the empirical picture of how things are in international affairs. Normatively 
speaking, many if not the majority of legal scholars as well as political philosophers reject the 
monist scenario of a world-state, i.e. replication of the pyramidal hierarchical structure of the 
modern state on the global level. The reasons for such reservations can be traced back to 
Immanuel Kant’s concerns about global despotism, and despite the wave of world-statism after 
the Second World War which was fueled by fears of a global nuclear disaster, this is the 
dominant narrative in contemporary academia.12 
In other words, most observers invest their hope into a pluralistic, polycentric vision of 
law which seems to align nicely with the governance approach to international politics. But all 
that is arguably inconsistent with the necessity of a shared and enforced legal framework for a 
task of PD-like dimensions, which by definition ought to take priority over other, lesser issues 
(as explained in more detail in 1.2.5, 1.2.8 and 1.3.3). To repeat, I am not putting forward a 
normative case in favor of a world-state; what I am offering is an if–then conditional based on a 
certain reading of the nature of international politics. To the extent that the case for PD is 
                                                                        
9 Mattias Kumm, “Constituent Power, Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism, and Post-Positivist Law,” 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 14, no. 3 (2016): 697–711, doi:10.1093/icon/mow050; David 
Held, Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities (Polity, 2010). 
10 Anne Peters, “Membership in the Global Constitutional Community,” in The Constitutionalization of 
International Law, ed. Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters, and Geir Ulfstein (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), 153–178; Anne Peters, “Constitutional Fragments: On the Interaction of Constitutionalization and 
Fragmentation in International Law,” CGC Working Paper, no. No. 2 (2015): 1–42. 
11 Federal countries might be thought to undermine this claim; however, there is always a layer of federal 
law applicable to all actors within the jurisdiction. The European Union is a unique case that will be 
commented upon later in the chapter. 
12 William E Scheuerman, The Realist Case for Global Reform (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2011), chap. 2; Lu 
Catherine, “World Government,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosohy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, 2012, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/world-government/. 
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rationally overwhelming and will be construed as such by major political actors, it could be 
perhaps said that my position overlaps with the famous argument by the foremost international 
relations theorist Alexander Wendt, who claimed that a world-state (accompanied by a 
corresponding shift in identities) is ultimately inevitable as a matter of self-interest of actors 
involved in international politics, including great powers.13 
1.2.2. Judicial reasoning as the panacea? 
I noted above that the judiciary has a central role and function in any political system 
based on the rule of law. How to establish the rule of law on the global level in a decentralized 
system of governance, though? Some supporters of a “global constitutionalism” claim that 
judicial reasoning – as opposed to political action – can provide the bridge among numerous 
levels of decision-making.14 The European Union, and especially the Court of Justice (CJEU), is 
often presented as a model case. However, notwithstanding the recent trend of recapturing of 
decision-making capacities by member-state’s executives, in response to the need of a more 
flexible and efficient decision-making than the EU political system is currently capable of 
providing,15 the CJEU itself quite unambiguously functions as the main engine of further 
unification of the Union.16 It thus again seems questionable that we can have authoritative 
judicial decisions linked to the principle of legal certainty (which co-forms the core of the rule of 
law) and a non-hierarchical soup of particular legal systems.17 Also, the sanitized world of 
judicial reasoning cannot be really isolated from the messy realities of mundane politics, 
including power competition. After all, the judicial branch of power is still only one among 
others. Numerous institutional and normative concerns thus apply, not least with regard to the 
efficiency and legitimacy of various governance options. Some of them, such as the problem of 
democratic political representation (1.3.1) or collective action problems (1.3.4) I discuss in the 
following sections, though the general point can be stated already here: Namely that PD cannot 
do without a robust political theory of international politics. 
1.2.3. Formal or material points of intersection 
The fact of societal diversity and pluralism is far from a new discovery. As however 
Michel Rosenfeld points out, the deep and wide plurality within modern societies has been 
always held together either by a formal legal framework (i.e. constitutions) consisting of “nodes” 
which encompass fundamental rules of cooperation in any political society, or by consensus over 
material/substantive values, principles etc., or most commonly by both.18 The reason is 
straightforward, namely to ensure conditions of social cooperation and stability of the social 
order. Since a fragmented and non-hierarchical global/international law cannot provide the 
                                                                        
13 It should be noted that Wendt’s claim rested on a specific recognition-based teleology. See Alexander 
Wendt, “Why a World State Is Inevitable,” European Journal of International Relations 9, no. 4 (December 
21, 2003): 491–542, doi:10.1177/135406610394001; Alexander Wendt, “Why a World State Is 
Inevitable,” in Global Governance, Global Government. International Visions for an Evolving World System, 
ed. Luis Cabrera (Albany: SUNY Press, 2011), 27–63. is an updated version of the argument. 
14 Neil Walker, “Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the Global Disorder of Normative 
Orders,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 6, no. 3–4 (2008): 373–96, doi:10.1093/icon/mon016. 
15 Vojtěch Belling, “Exekutivní Vládnutí Jako Nový Model Politiky v Evropské Unii? Krizová Politika EU a 
Její Dopady Na Politický Systém,” Mezinarodni Vztahy 49, no. 4 (2014): 9–27. 
16 Examples include the principles of direct effect as well as supremacy of EU law over domestic law, as 
settled by the CJEU itself. This means that provided certain procedural conditions are met, European laws 
(so-called regulations and directives) take precedence over member states’ legislation. Paul P. Craig and 
Gráinne De Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Material, 6th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).  
17 For a related discussion of pluralism and monism in international law see Alexander Somek, “Monism: A 
Tale of the Undead,” in Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond, ed. Matej Avbelj and Jan 
Komárek (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012), 343–380. 
18 Michel Rosenfeld, “Rethinking Constitutional Ordering in an Era of Legal and Ideological Pluralism,” 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 6, no. 3–4 (2008): 415–55, doi:10.1093/icon/mon023. 
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formal pillar (i.e. unified body of global constitutional law, containing the said “nodes”), global 
societal integration greatly depends on the construction of a common cosmopolitan framework 
of values and self-understandings. Even though it might constitute a commendable moral ideal, a 
shared, even though presumably thin, global identity is a fragile utopian goal, as the recent wave 
of populism, nationalism, and cultural and economic protectionism amply attests. Achieving 
such a shared feeling of global commonality is certainly a tall order (more on this in section 1.4 
pod), rendered even more difficult by such explicit rejection on a unified legal system. 
1.2.4. The point and purpose of law 
If “achieving social order” is one of the basic purposes of law,19 then it needs to be made 
public and well known, so that everyone affected can, at least in principle, verify which legal 
rules are in force. Only legal rules are in principle accessible by their recipients can be thus 
binding for them (To complicate things a bit, it could be argued that only those legal rules I can 
reasonably expect the majority of other actors to uphold are binding; I discuss this point in 
section 1.3.4). If PD is to operate within the bounds of legality, and if the resulting legal rules are 
to be binding for all relevant actors (sometimes that might mean directly all individual human 
beings), then PD-related decisions need to be promulgated publicly, continually, globally, 
authoritatively, and consistently. How this could be done in a decentralized system of 
governance remains a matter of concern. 
 An objection might be pressed – and this is indeed a fairly common response in 
contemporary legal and political theory – that such a view of law and legal obligation remains 
locked in the old hierarchical understanding of law. My response is that I simply cannot see how 
long-term global cooperation with respect to PD can proceed effectively in a non-hierarchical 
system of international law. Insofar as the foundational rationale of judicial decision-making is 
to aim for “authoritative resolution of a legal problem,”20 and as long as conflicts among different 
norms or legal orders are inevitable in a decentralized system of global governance, then global 
cooperation in such a huge task of coordination as represented by PD is difficult to envision.  
Flexibility and open-texturedness of the emerging global system of law might be considered 
virtues in many areas of human activity (such as, say, commercial law), as they arguably involve 
engagement with different value systems and their cultural backgrounds. PD is however one of 
those areas where these qualities become vices. Development, deployment, and control of such 
sensitive technology as laser beam and nuclear weapons is simply not the right object of legal 
and political experiments, not least because the common goal is fully known beforehand. 
1.2.5. Securitization, pluralism, and self-government 
There are, of course, other rationales behind the decentralized approach. One basic point 
of global governance models concerns the importance of preservation of autonomy and self-
government on lower levels of political organization (from regional formations to as low as 
municipalities), in order to avoid the danger of global authoritarianism and retain both the idea 
and practice of democracy. The principle of subsidiarity has a foremost place in such visions and 
has been commonly invoked with respect to the European Union.21 One weighty reason behind 
this principle is the fact of moral, cultural, religious diversity. Liberal conscience counsels 
toleration, or even celebration, of diversity (within certain limits specified by liberalism itself). 
If, however, PD presupposes securitization – more precisely, existential-threat 
macrosecuritization on a planetary level (see 1.3.3 pod) – which I argue it necessarily does, then 
fairly limited room remains for pluralism and self-government, simply because of the 
                                                                        
19 Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, 2nd ed. (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1969), chap. 3. 
20 Pavel Ondřejek, “Státní Moc a Mezinárodní Právo Mezi Nadřazeností a Dialogem,” in Kolos Na Hliněných 
Nohou? K Proměnám Srtátu a Jeho Rolí, ed. Jan Kysela and Pavel Ondřejek (Praha: Leges, 2016), 125. 
21 Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). The principle 
originated within Christian (mostly Catholic) social teaching/ethics; see Arno Anzenbacher, Christliche 
Sozialethik: Einführung Und Prinzipien (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöning, 1998), 210. 
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unconditional and depoliticizing nature of securitization. The threat is labelled as objective, and 
the discretionary (i.e. insulated from normal democratic control and accountability) decision on 
how to cope with it is thus rendered immune to protest and disagreement. Of course, asteroid 
threats are claimed to be genuinely objective, as they can be explained and calculated in precise 
scientific language – including the possibilities of collision aversion and/or asteroid trajectory 
alteration. Such securitization might be very well a just one, as Nikola Schmidt argues in Chapter 
XXX;22 nevertheless, it would still imply unconditional compliance with the selected course of 
action by all involved actors – from states to international organizations to individual human 
beings. Unless PD is properly securitized (i.e. if it is “merely” politicized, introduced as a relevant 
political topic in public debates), it is unclear why it is to take immediate priority over other 
policy goals – say, eradication of world poverty (see 15.2.7 for a discussion of competing 
securitization initiatives). 
In effect, this creates a dilemma between two scenarios: Securitization at the expense of 
self-government, and no-securitization at the expense of survival of humanity (or so the 
argument goes). My point is not that the former course of action is not preferable, but that we 
cannot have both – that is, subsidiarity/self-government and PD-level securitization – at once. 
Incidentally, all this also seriously weakens the case for a “judicial dialogue” across the many 
levels and sectors, which is however precisely the way how defenders of global legal 
pluralism/polycentrism envision the possibility of binding common decisions. Plainly, a dialogue 
is of little use if we know that enforceable decisions are made elsewhere and on highly different 
grounds. 
1.2.6. Global rule of law and constituent power 
The preceding sections employ the notion of a rule of law. This is a inconspicuous 
concept; however, the fact is that without a rule of law, there can be no democracy, no protection 
of human rights, and arguably, no reciprocal social cooperation, at least not a democratic one. It 
is not by chance that the rule of law constitutes a conceptual, normative and institutional pillar 
of liberal constitutional democracies, and a precondition of consistent enforcement of citizens’ 
fundamental rights.23 It could be even argued that establishing a functional rule of law is the 
most basic challenge for any stable transnational or cosmopolitan legal and political system.24 As 
with previous issues, weighty reasons have been put forward by scholars of legal and political 
theory against a monistic conception of a global legal system, that is, one imposed from above by 
highest-level institutions such as currently the UN Security Council.25 Such a rule of law would 
be unilateral, they claim, rooted in the allegedly obsolete conception of modern sovereign 
statehood, and would thus undermine autonomy and self-government based the principle of 
subsidiarity. 
But herein lies the paradox. In order to fulfil its rule of law-specified and -constrained 
functions, law needs to be the same for all affected subjects and its force needs to be inescapable 
(at least in principle), and this is highly dubious in a fragmented system of global governance 
that lacks constitutionalized and legalized enforcement power.26 The PD regime would be only 
                                                                        
22 See also Rita Floyd, “Can Securitization Theory Be Used in Normative Analysis? Towards a Just 
Securitization Theory,” Security Dialogue 42, no. 4–5 (2011): 427–39, doi:10.1177/0967010611418712. 
23 See e.g. Martin Loghlin, The Foundations of Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), chap. 11. 
24 Gianluigi Palombella, “The Rule of Law beyond the State: Failures, Promises, and Theory,” International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 7, no. 3 (2009): 442–67, doi:10.1093/icon/mop012. 
25 The infamous Kadi case which concerned the hierarchy between international law – specifically UN 
Security Council resolutions – and EU law (and by implication, of domestic law as well) is probably the 
clearest recent example. See G De Búrca, “The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order 
after Kadi,” Harvard International Law Journal 51, no. 1 (2010): 1–49; Matej Avbelj, Filippo Fontanelli, and 
Giuseppe Martinico, Kadi on Trial: A Multifaceted Analysis of the Kadi Trial (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014). 
26 For some further reflections on the rule of law in global context see William E. Scheuerman, 
“Cosmopolitan Democracy and the Rule of Law,” Ratio Juris 15, no. 4 (December 2002): 439–57, 
doi:10.1111/1467-9337.00218. 
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one among many, without having any clear priority which it implicitly requires (for reasons 
stated above). If, alternatively, the recognition of valid norms were to proceed via an emergent 
consensus on substantive normative commitments (e.g. the content of the ius cogens and erga 
omnes obligations;27, then we would quickly enter the domain of (international) political theory 
which has been centrally concerned with ways of accommodating normative conflicts among 
actors as well as among orders on which various actors operate. By entering this field, questions 
and problems for PD supporters multiply in both number and nature, as will be clear from 
section 1.3 pod. 
To take stock before advancing further, I am of the view that robust global democratic 
governance cannot do without elements of (postnational) statehood, even if this does not 
amount to a blind replication of a sovereign state on the global level. Coupled with the 
securitization-fueled urgency of PD, it seems obvious to me that a solid global rule of law is 
cannot be squared with a decentralized model of lawmaking – the two rationales simply collide. 
Consequently, PD calls for significant transformation of how international and/or global politics 
is done and understood by both its protagonists and the global audience (which is mostly a 
metaphor). My hunch is, however, that such a shift cannot be rationally designed and swiftly 
executed, because evolution of such complex systems as international law and politics is simply 
beyond the capacities of any existing actor. Some hope has been invested into reconstruction of 
the United Nations,28 much hope into the European Union as a laboratory of global governance. 
Yet the outlook is ambiguous, as most recently the Brexit has shown. 
The inescapability of political-theoretical considerations of this kind is further confirmed 
by looking into the process of norm generation in the global realm. 29  On a liberal 
intergovernmentalist model of global governance which seems to inform the vision defended in 
this book, the bulk of public legal and administrative regulations is produced by countries’ 
executives or executive-authorized agencies (where the latter can be national, transnational, or 
global). One problem here is the tendency of international bodies towards becoming 
independent on their supposed principals (see further 1.3.2 pod); another problem concerns the 
legitimacy of thusly generated legal norms. Put schematically, the chain of legitimization is too 
long, too abstract and too incomplete in order for such norms to gain – or perhaps just retain – 
democratic legitimacy. Technically speaking, a country’s executive as one branch of constituted 
power directly or indirectly co-creates on supranational level new bodies, norms, and 
corresponding duties, the latter of which are meant to bind the citizens (“the people”) who are in 
fact the constituent power – i.e. logically and normatively prior.30 The problem lies in the fact 
that the constituent power has little real influence over such global-level decisions, or little 
opportunity to effectively contest them – national parliaments which normally represent the 
people are notoriously weak actors in international politics. This may result in various 
pathologies of power exercised by trans- or supranational bodies, as discussed further in 1.3.2. 
After all, even in constitutional democratic states themselves there is preciously little public 
                                                                        
27 Palombella, “The Rule of Law beyond the State: Failures, Promises, and Theory.” 
28 Held, Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities, 230. 
29 Markus Patberg, “Against Democratic Intergovernmentalism: The Case for a Theory of Constituent 
Power in the Global Realm,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 14, no. 3 (2016): 622–38, 
doi:10.1093/icon/mow040. 
30 This is a common distinction in constitutional law literature. In a constitutional democracy at least, 
constituent power is embodied in the sovereign people who is the foundational source of all power in a 
state. The people as the sovereign “gives” itself the constitution which, in turn, gives birth and form to the 
political system, including the highest constitutional institutions (branches of power, constitutional court, 
central banks etc.) and the division of power among them. All these are created in the act of constitutional 
self-giving, and as such are constituted powers. This is a very interesting if highly abstract and 
philosophically challenging issue concerning the deepest sources of legitimacy in a democratic society 
(recall occasional tensions between parliaments and constitutional courts), and here I have to simplify 
things somewhat. Cf. Loghlin, The Foundations of Public Law; Andrew Arato, Post Sovereign Constitutional 
Making: Learning and Legitimacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 1–74. 
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deliberation, and thus democratic control, over the goals and purposes of political action in the 
international/global realm. Widespread indifference to EU-related issues among citizens of EU 
member states is an illustration of this problem. 
The upshot is that we need global constituent power – a global demos no less, whatever 
kind of actors and procedures this entails – if the global rule of law is to function properly and 
global law is to be perceived as legitimate. 
1.2.7. Conflicts of regimes, goals, and purposes 
All this is because, as already hinted, conflicts among regimes, actors, levels of decision-
making as well as goals and purposes are to be expected – if only for reasons of sheer complexity 
of global governance in an expected multi-level pluralist setting. Scholars have recently begun to 
speak about non-hierarchical regime complexes or regime complexity which depicts “presence of 
nested, partially overlapping, and parallel international regimes that are not hierarchically 
ordered.”31 Under such fragmented conditions, clarity of legal obligations erodes. Some authors 
add that such a labyrinthine system of governance is open to exploitation by great powers.32 
More sympathetically minded alternatives such as global experimentalist governance aimed at 
“participatory and multilevel collective problem solving”33 assume a highly decentralized system 
of rule-making and rule-enforcement, which, again, goes directly against what PD appears to 
require. 
More specifically, once we look into contemporary realities of power and politics in the 
international realm, as well as into the issues that motivate global political activism, it becomes 
clear that PD will be merely one among many competing macrosecuritizations. Paradoxically, 
given the nuclear-destigmatizing ethos of PD carried by the hope in a rationally justifiable 
mitigation method the anti-nuclear movement coupled with fears that destigmatization might 
undermine the non-proliferation regime may actually rival PD as regards (macro-)level, degree, 
and perhaps acceptance as well.34 Moreover, it is far from inconceivable and actually quite likely 
that competing versions of a desirable PD regime itself will be put forward and steadfastly stuck 
to by their supporters – including, as it were, various IR research communities with their 
idiosyncratic assumptions and/or normative preferences. But of course, PD is precisely the kind 
of issue which requires consensus, cooperation, and orchestrated political and financial effort. 
Will there be an actor capable of, and legitimized to, decide which course of action is to be taken 
with respect to a macrosecuritized topic such as PD? 
If the answer is affirmative, then we are faced with something or someone akin to a 
global sovereign: Recall that PD-related macrosecuritization is to take absolute priority over 
competing macrosecuritizations, let alone regular political goals. Such a state of affairs can 
hardly be achieved by simply coming up with just another international regime, especially if the 
new global political authority were to carry democratic legitimacy, not least in order to keep 
other powerful actors in check.  
1.2.8. State of exception as the norm 
Let us assume that PD-based macrosecuritization has been successful and the global 
audience consents to granting unquestionable priority to PD-related policies and/or actions.35 
This means, among others, that the regime has been isolated from regular politics and made 
                                                                        
31 Karen J. Alter and Sophie Meunier, “The Politics of International Regime Complexity,” Perspectives on 
Politics 7, no. 1 (2009): 13, doi:10.1017/S1537592709090033. 
32 Daniel W. Drezner, “The Power and Peril of International Regime Complexity,” Perspectives on Politics 7, 
no. 1 (2009): 65–70, doi:10.1017/S1537592709090100. 
33 Gráinne De Búrca, Robert O. Keohane, and Charles Sabel, “Global Experimentalist Governance,” British 
Journal of Political Science 44, no. 3 (2014): 477, doi:10.1017/S0007123414000076. 
34 Buzan and Waever, “Macrosecuritization and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale in 
Securitization Theory,” 259. 
35 See chapter XXX of this volume for the nuts and bolts of securitization theory. 
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impervious to change by normal (constitutional) means. What will be the legal status of the 
newly securitized regime? Chapter XXX mentions a “special legal regime”, but also hints to the 
possibility – forcefully campaigned for by the PD community – that PD measures (especially in 
its nuclear-friendly version) could rather operate “beyond the pale of legal regulation”, that is, in 
a state-of-exception mode – presumably for reasons of efficiency and speeding up of decision-
making procedures. In my view, there are two areas of concern, or at least of uncertainty. 
First, a successfully securitized extra-legal global PD regime would be difficult to 
desecuritize, and perhaps desecuritization would be undesirable, given the seriousness and 
omnipresence of the threat. In such a case, we would have a state of exception that became the 
norm. Not just intuitively, however, there is something deeply unsettling about the possibility of 
a perpetual state of exception. Indeed, a standard objection again normative use of securitization 
theory as such points out that securitization proceeds at the expense of regular democratic 
politics. The omnipresence of a securitized asteroid threat would seem to preclude any moves 
towards strengthening democratic legitimacy of decision-making structures and procedures on 
the global level. Quite the contrary, argue critics of securitization: It would represent a step 
towards global hegemony of whoever is able to exploit and perhaps control the language of 
securitization.36 Nurturing collective fears of immigration as an imminent danger to citizens of 
European countries is a useful example-analogy: Different beliefs and policies follow from 
framing immigrants as (variably) “people in need”, “terrorists”, “victims of Western colonial 
imperialism”, “parents of four”, “cheap labor force”, “threat to employment rate”, “threat to 
social security system”, or “enrichment of diversity”.37  
Second, paraphrasing the famous proposition by constitutional and legal theorist Carl 
Schmitt,38 whoever decides on the introduction of a (global) state of exception becomes the 
sovereign power in the given realm; it is also to be expected that whoever he is, this actor will 
control the means of defense against extra-terrestrial threats and will decide on their 
deployment. Insofar as, due to the comprehensive global nature of the threat, PD ought to 
assume priority over other concerns and policy goals, those endowed with the power to decide 
on PD will in effect structure limits and possibilities of political action in other areas as well. 
Thus arises a global sovereign power as a result of PD-based macrosecuritization. 
Although we cannot simply assume it will become authoritarian or despotic, abuse of power is 
always a distinct possibility, and this is why thinking about the institutional context of PD needs 
to be more acutely aware of the legal-political context. The role and secure status of political 
opposition, without which a healthy democracy can be hardly imagined,39 is one such issue for 
further reflection. 
1.3. Politics and Democracy 
Democratic cosmopolitan governance has recently become almost a magic formula for 
political theorists. Although some doubts expressed in the previous section (1.2) do apply here 
as well, there is a host of discipline-specific questions to be asked. Most generally, insofar as 
policy (including budgetary) priorities need to be set among competing goals and purposes, we 
are speaking about political decisions which necessarily precede efforts of bureaucratic-rational 
policy administration and implementation. 
                                                                        
36 For a more discussion of such claims see Paul Roe, “Is Securitization a ‘negative’ Concept? Revisiting the 
Normative Debate over Normal versus Extraordinary Politics,” Security Dialogue 43, no. 3 (2012): 249–66, 
doi:10.1177/0967010612443723. 
37 I use these examples in a slightly different context in Pavel Dufek, “Lidská Práva, Ideologie a Veřejné 
Ospravedlnění: Co Obnáší Brát Pluralismus Vážně,” Právník 157, no. 1 (2018): 62. 
38 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2011), 5. 
39 Ian Shapiro, Democratic Justice (Yale: Yale University Press, 1999), 39–45. 
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1.3.1. Political representation and legitimacy 
In section 1.2.6 the notion of a chain of legitimization was mentioned, concerning the 
implicit transfer of legitimacy from the domestic level, where elections ensure reasonable 
proximity between citizens and institutions of state power, to international organizations and 
other supranational bodies whose democratic legitimacy is at best indirect, mediated via 
selected domestic actors (especially the executive in its foreign policy role). Now similarly to the 
domestic case, values such as long-term stability or political loyalty invite a search for ways of 
linking the decisions made on transnational/global level to interests, preferences, or identities of 
those in whose name they are made. After all, even if we cannot reproduce on the global level 
the type of democracy we are intimately familiar with on the nation-state level, presumably 
greater rather than lesser responsiveness, accountability, and responsibility is called for – so 
that the lack of democratic proximity is partly offset by other means. This is the domain of (a 
theory of) political representation, which obviously applies to PD as well if democracy is a 
political regime (model of political decision-making) worth retaining. 
In my view, there are essentially four ways of approaching the challenge. One possibility 
is to reject these desiderata and argue that some kind of paternalism is required – that is, 
thinking and acting for (meaning instead of) ordinary people who are incapable of recognizing 
their true interests. Some hints in this direction can be traced in other contributions to this 
volume; cf. the ideas of “technology interdependence” (chapter XXX) or the disdain for 
“delusional people” (chapter 21). But this will be hard to square with the democratic ethos 
which otherwise permeates the international community, a great majority of international 
political theory (including EU studies), and also the general ethical background of the present PD 
project. 
Another possibility is to argue that since the PD regime will be securitized in case of its 
successful implementation (thus acquiring priority over other regimes and policy goals), regular 
democratic politics – consisting, as it were, in bargaining, deliberation, bartering, compromises, 
fulfilled and broken promises, clever subterfuges, and so on – loses relevance (as it should be 
with securitized issues anyway). Yet this implies that a state-of-exception becomes the norm 
(see 1.2.8), otherwise PD would have to return to the normal (politicized) stage after some time. 
Not only would issues of representation immediately reappear, but also the capacity to 
efficiently deal with PD-related tasks and challenges would be lost. Obversely, however, we have 
seen that a permanent state of exception is hardly desirable from a democratic point of view, 
and this is why the problem of democratic representation cannot be simply blocked off in that 
way. 
A third option would be to follow recent attempts to separate representation from the 
electoralist channel it has become identified with, and argue that various actors – such as 
scientists or (groups of) activists – can lay down the claim to represent the interests of the 
humanity, without having been provided any authority at all to do so via the electoral 
mechanism.40 This approach to representation has been labelled constructivist. The problem 
with constructivism concerns the absence on the global level of a robust electoral mode of 
representation which arguably forms the precondition for the alternatives to flourish. While 
constructivists present their dynamic version of representation as complementary to the 
standard electoralist model, they stop short of claiming that we can actually do without elections 
– these are taken as necessary, even though not by themselves sufficient for democratic 
representation. But if this is the case, then supranational constructivist political representation 
is radically incomplete, insofar as electoral representation is basically non-existent there, save 
for the notoriously problematic case of the European Union.41 
                                                                        
40 Michael Saward, The Representative Claim (Oxford University Press, 2010). 
41 Alessandro Mulieri, “Beyond Electoral Democracy? A Critical Assessment of Constructivist 
Representation in the Global Arena,” Representation 49, no. 4 (November 2013): 515–27, 
doi:10.1080/00344893.2013.846276. 
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The fourth possibility has been already hinted to – namely the emergence of a global 
constituent power which would serve as the source of political legitimacy, analogously to the 
constitutionalist fiction of “a people” upon which existing constitutional (liberal) democracies 
rest. Let us assume for the sake of argument that such a scenario is in principle conceivable.42 
However, the question then naturally arises who or what will be the constituted power? If a 
global parliament, then a global government comes as a natural corollary; after all, what use is a 
legislative body without an efficient executive to implement the legislation. If it is to be “merely” 
a global government of sorts, then not only the role of the UN General Assembly becomes 
unclear; the very notion of a legislative body loses meaning. And I have discussed above (15.2.2) 
the indispensability of the judiciary. In short, it seems difficult to imagine under this fourth 
scenario a system of political representation which would be significantly different from the 
domestic model. 
1.3.2. Agent–principal relationship and independence of international bodies 
Some contributors to this volume seem to assume, in a broadly intergovernmentalist 
manner, that global bodies authorized to either make or carry out PD-related decisions would be 
at least accountable to governments of involved countries, under the classic principal–agent 
model of delegation: Principals set goals while agents are authorized to seek them, being in turn 
held accountable by their principals. Yet research into institutions such as the IMF or the UN 
Secretariat reveals that they tend to become at least partially autonomous actors independent 
on the will or interest of their founders (i.e. principals).43 As agents possessing more or less 
legitimate authority and capable of defining “problems” and mobilizing resources for their 
solution, international organizations wield power, or the ability to force other actors behave in a 
way they otherwise would not. Creating and enforcing obligatory rules regarding human rights 
and humanitarian intervention are two prominent examples of this power. 
There is no reason to assume that duties or obligations related to PD would be different, 
and as long as PD can be categorized as a “huge, aspirational task”, then even more power is 
probably required.44 Yet the problem of accountability looms hard. As long as there is no 
meaningful political layer over the global bureaucratic/administrative/scientific networks 
(understood as embodiments of rationality and impartiality), then it becomes difficult to assign 
responsibility if things go wrong in some way, as they very well might. Recall that responsibility 
is one of the desiderata applicable to democratic representation on the global level, especially in 
situations which call for deployment of sensitive technology. Barnett and Finnemore elaborate 
on inevitable pathological tendencies within the bureaucratic juggernauts that are international 
organizations (in their case, IMF and two UN agencies), singling out (a) routinization and 
ritualization of internal practices and (b) compartmentalization resulting in tunnel vision by the 
agencies as well as their subunits.45 Several more particular dysfunctions are the consequence, 
which should cause some concern for those who view  trans-and supra-national actors as mostly 
transmission belts for lower-level goals and preferences. 
1.3.3. Macrosecuritization = macrodepoliticization = dedemocratization 
It is worth repeating that PD presupposes planetary-wide, physical-threat, all-
comprehensive macrosecuritization in order to have reasonable chance for success. I argued 
above (1.2.5) that such a move is incompatible with normative and political pluralism, including 
                                                                        
42 For an interesting discussion see Christian List and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, “Can There Be a Global 
Demos? An Agency-Based Approach,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 38, no. 1 (2010): 76–110, 
doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.2009.01174.x. 
43 Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules of the World: International Organizations in Global Politics 
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2004). 
44 Dufek, “Why Strong Moral Cosmopolitanism Requires a World-State,” 197. 
45 Barnett and Finnemore, Rules of the World: International Organizations in Global Politics, 38–41. See also 
MN Barnett and Martha Finnemore, “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations,” 
International Organization 53, no. 4 (1999): 699–732. 
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local or regional self-government based on the principle of subsidiarity, if the result is to be 
stable (uncontested) in the long term. Here I want to emphasize my worry about 
macrodepoliticization, since depoliticization in the given realm is what this securitization 
entails.46 Schematically, depoliticization stands simply for “taking an issue off the political 
agenda”, or alternatively, “making it a public non-issue”, thus avoiding democratic political 
conflict of interests, opinions, preferences, identities etc. Appeals to scientific facts or rational 
inevitability (they usually go hand-to-hand) are quintessential depoliticizing moves, perhaps 
most resolutely employed by environmentalist groups. The scientific rationalistic discourse 
attached to PD-type macrosecuritization obviously follows this depoliticizing logic, not least 
because it is meant to achieve precisely that.47 As might be clear from the preceding sections, 
detachment of decision-making from public involvement comes at a hefty price, even though it 
might be deemed necessary by involved actors. Ultimately, behind all this lurks rule by experts, a 
kind of scientific-administrative epistocracy which by definition needs no democratic legitimacy. 
While the case for such epistocracy might very well be rationally convincing, the resulting 
political regime would be anything but democratic – in contrast to the original vision of PD 
embedded in multi-level global democratic governance. As indicated before, not all good things 
go necessarily together in PD. 
Now the PD community could collectively reply that the relevant agenda will be limited, 
both sectorally and with regards to its scope, not least because the envisioned type of global 
political authority is semi- and not fully-cosmopolitan. This response is highly implausible, 
because, first, it is question-begging: Whether the suitable political counterpart is semi-
cosmopolitan multi-level global governance, or full-fledged global political authority, is precisely 
the point of contention, and cannot be thus used as an argument (as it would be supporting 
itself). Most of what I say in this chapter is meant to show that the latter option – the “world-
state model” – is much better equipped to make PD policy legitimate, efficient, stable, and thus 
ultimately successful. Second, and similar to nuclear weapons macrosecuritization, it makes 
sense to construe PD as a widely inclusive (i.e. comprehensive) macrosecuritizing move across 
multiple sectors, as its very rationale is to minimize “the number of separate concerns, issues 
and conflicts that achieve strong securitization separately from the macrosecuritization.”48 This 
basically means that due to its all-encompassing nature and scientific interdisciplinarity,49 PD 
has to be accorded complete or near-complete priority vis-à-vis other candidates for 
securitization or even macrosecuritization. I truly do not find it convincing that such an 
ambitious plan as PD can be successfully implemented in a weakly centralized system of 
governance, and certainly not in a genuinely democratic one. 
1.3.4. Public goods production and collective action problems. Expectations of respect for 
rules 
One central reason for such skepticism has to do with public goods provision. “Public 
good” in the sense I use it here is a technical term in economic science, defined by two basic 
attributes. PD seems to constitute a (rare) pure public good, as it is both non-excludable (no one 
can be intentionally excluded from its enjoyment once supply has started) and characterized by 
non-rival consumption (its enjoyment does not reduce the amount left for others).50 Yet this 
                                                                        
46 I leave aside the debate on the „politics of securitization“ (e.g. Ole Wæver, “Politics, Security, Theory,” 
Security Dialogue 42, no. 4–5 (August 21, 2011): 465–80, doi:10.1177/0967010611418718.) as it 
addresses different types of issues. 
47 See also Chapter XXX on weapons of mass protection and the risk of rational science argumentation. 
48 Buzan and Waever, “Macrosecuritization and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale in 
Securitization Theory,” 258. 
49 Seen from this angle, the present chapter might be perhaps also read as an appeal to the importance of 
social sciences and humanities in this interdisciplinary undertaking. 
50 Gerald Gaus, On Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth, 2008), 88. By 
implication, there are also impure public goods which are either non-rivalrous but excludable (such as 
copyrighted works), or non-excludable but subject to congestion (such as fish stocks). 
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obviously gives rise to a textbook incentive to free ride, especially in Prisoner’s Dilemma-type of 
situations which are supplied generously by international politics. 51  The plurality of 
independent actors in international politics – in the first place, sovereign states, but certainly not 
merely them – is not kept in check by an efficient superior authority. If the standard response 
from within normative political theory is correct, then the very existence of government – in our 
case, global government – endowed with sufficient power to deter potential free-riders is not 
only (morally) permitted, but also rationally required. Arguably, the more essential the public 
good is – technically speaking, the more we can expect that having the good (either paid or 
unpaid for) is strictly preferred by relevant actors to not having the good –, the stronger the case 
for global government (and by implication, global taxation and administration and all the related 
stuff) becomes. Of course, PD trades on the claim that the good it is primarily meant to secure – 
the very physical existence of mankind – is conceptually and normatively prior to any other 
conceivable human good. 
Two points seem to weaken this line of argument. First, there are seemingly excludable 
technological and commercial side-benefits of PD from the enjoyment of which the parties to the 
larger deal would not want to be excluded (as argued in Chapter XXX), and this by itself should 
produce incentives not to defect (free-ride), even under the current interstate system. My hunch 
is that at least with respect to technology, this fix would work for only a limited timeframe, for 
reasons of technology diffusion and, obviously, theft. As regards extra-terrestrial extraction of 
resources (Moon base etc., see Part III of this book), no one should be surprised if those actors 
who contribute the most – presumably current great powers – would want to benefit the most, 
to the effect that access to the benefit would be highly unequal, further weakening the case for 
wide voluntary cooperation (not to mention competition among great powers). 
Second, it might be argued that there are cases where public goods can be provided 
without contribution of each and every actor (e.g. funds and capacities by 150 out of 200 actors, 
such as states, suffice to provide the good). But this is a slippery slope: For a social rule (norm) 
to be considered authoritative and binding by the actors, they need to expect observation of the 
rule by a sufficiently large set of other actors.52 If non-defecting actors see that one can get away 
with defecting, then the stability and perhaps very existence of the rule is put in jeopardy. In my 
view, all this points to the indispensability of a legitimate political authority on the global level 
(in case of PD). Although the arch-globalist David Held agrees that public goods provision as a 
positive externality of great powers’ national interests can be no longer assumed in an 
increasingly multipolar and heterogeneous world,53 he nevertheless thinks that especially “in 
the face of incontrovertible security threats” can relevant powerful actors “gain much more from 
cooperation than from conflict”54 (see also chapter XXX of this volume on the motivation not to 
be excluded from benefits of cooperation). In other words, it is in the interest of great powers to 
keep producing public goods, which means that we can have the cake (comprehensive global 
governance) and eat it at the same time (i.e. avoid world statism). 
Equipped with this assumption, Held et al. furnish their cosmopolitan visions with a wide 
array of norms and principles to be observed by all actors. Although no leading author I know of 
has directly engaged the issue of PD, the general normative outlook of cosmopolitan democratic 
work is very much in line with the one elaborated in other chapters of this book. I hope to have 
shown why a mere existence of a norm (written or customary) cannot by itself assure 
compliance by sufficient number of relevant actors. In a case such as PD, where what is at stake 
                                                                        
51 Ibid., 109. 
52 Christine Bicchieri, The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 11; Gerald Gaus, The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and 
Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 165; H.L.A Hart, 
The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 56. 
53 David Held, “Elements of a Theory of Global Governance,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 42, no. 9 (2016): 
843–45, doi:10.1177/0191453716659520. 
54 Ibid., 844. 
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is control and deployment of extremely powerful (thermos)nuclear weapons, it seems to me that 
the existence of an (ideally) impartial external and supreme authority capable of enforcement 
constitutes a precondition for willing cooperation. 
1.4. Democracy, Identity, and Society 
1.4.1. Global “we” as a prescriptive project 
In 1.2.3 nad, I discussed the possibility of material points of intersection as a path 
towards global cooperation, adding that this consideration points towards a “common global 
identity”. For sure, though, no such “global we” is currently available, apart from philosophical 
conceptions of what has been termed moral cosmopolitanism, whose links to political practice 
are loose at best.55 Talk of a “multinational global cosmopolitan village” (Chapter XXX of this 
volume) sounds too journalistic to my liking; mostly members of affluent countries’ middle and 
higher strata see the world this particular way, and the ongoing “immigration crisis” in Europe 
(as of 2018) attests that a widespread “cosmopolitan we-feeling” is mostly a philosopher’s 
pipedream (see also 1.4.3 pod). Put differently, the “perspective of humanity” is an essentially 
prescriptive notion packed with not a little controversial normative baggage. We can look at 
difficulties with procuring even the most basic human rights worldwide, or the failure of most 
developed (well-off) countries to achieve the target of development aid (0,7 % of gross national 
income), to see how different the world is. 
It might be replied that a threat of “planet-killer asteroid” magnitude would bring 
humanity together. Perhaps it would; the catch is that designing and building of the PD 
infrastructure, including the overarching political architecture, cannot wait until the threat 
materializes, and in such a case all reservations noted in this chapter apply. Forging common 
identities is not a task that can be accomplished overnight, as will be further pointed out in 1.4.5. 
Historic experience of modern statehood suggests that the existence of a common political-
institutional framework serves as a useful and perhaps indispensable instrument for 
constructing common identities. All the hype about “common European identity” built around 
what the political philosopher Jürgen Habermas and others have called constitutional patriotism 
assumes that there is a set of universally valid constitutional values and principles which are 
embedded in and promulgated by shared political and judicial institutions.56 I add that for a task 
of PD proportions, “mere” constitutionalization of world politics is insufficient and would need 
to be accompanied by establishing a robust system of global political institutions.57 
1.4.2. Public identity and internalization of public rules  
So the birth of common cosmopolitan identity needs to be assisted somehow. In fact, one 
often overlooked yet fundamental element of liberalism as political theory58 is complementarity 
of private and public individual identity, where the latter corresponds with the individual’s 
                                                                        
55 Moral cosmopolitanism stands for the belief that all human beings are members of a moral community 
of mankind, which means that they share certain morally relevant characteristics which should bear upon 
further moral and political considerations (as regards, say, duties to immigrants, human rights policies, 
poverty reduction and so on). See Simon Caney, Justice Beyond Borders. A Global Political Theory. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005); Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2008); List and Koenig-Archibugi, “Can There Be a Global Demos? An Agency-Based Approach.” 
56 Jan Werner Müller, Constitutional Patriotism (Princenton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Jürgen 
Habermas, Zur Verfassung Europas: Ein Essay (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2011). 
57 For a defense of constitutionalization of world politics, see Jürgen Habermas, “A Political Constitution 
for a Pluralist World Society?,” in Between Naturalism and Religion: Philosophical Essays, ed. Jürgen 
Habermas (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), 312–52. 
58 Liberal political ideas inform the bulk of cosmopolitan political thought, so that cosmopolitanism is 
usually a shorthand for cosmopolitan liberalism. The part of liberalism which is most relevant here is its 
emphasis on basic rights and liberties of the individual, as well as insistence of fundamental moral 
equality of all human beings. These ideas normatively co-ground constitutional democracies. 
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internalization of shared public rules and norms which set up the basic normative framework of 
a given polity. This is, in fact, a precondition of the realization of individual liberty, and it has a 
lot to do with the importance of the rule of law (see section 1.2.6). To drive the point home, 
there has to be a legitimate political authority which ensures that these rules and norms are 
publicly promulgated, respected, protected and enforced, not least because they may entail both 
rights and obligations. As pointed out above (1.3.4), mere existence of a norm cannot by itself 
ensure compliance. If there is no such authority on the global level, and if cosmopolitan 
liberalism is deemed a desirable normative vehicle for dealing with global challenges and issues, 
then it follows that some such global political body needs to be created.59 Not surprisingly, this 
perspective overlaps with reflections on the rule of law above (1.2.6) as well as with the “guiding 
idea” that an overarching legal framework is required (0). 
1.4.3. In-groups and out-groups. Global political identity. 
Another set of reasons for the previous conclusion is provided by social psychological 
research which plentifully reveals that people are generally pre-programmed to define their 
social identity (self-understanding) in terms of social groups defined by objective or quasi-
objective traits (ethnic, geographical, gender etc.), and in opposition to individuals/groups 
which do not fit into the self-definition. This is the basis for the in-group vs. out-group distinction 
explored by social psychologists and neuroscientists.60 Such a self-identification with in-group 
traits inevitably carries moral distinctions: “We” are better than “the others”, because we do 
things right and they do things wrong – where “better” ultimately means “our way”. The upshot 
is that the prescriptive project of a “global political identity” is highly ambitious in the sense that 
it challenges certain deep human inclinations without actually providing the tools for 
overcoming them (apart from idealistic hopes). In my view, this finding should further dampen 
the global governance-based optimism about PD. 
1.4.4. Reasons vs. motivation for respecting norms. 
Many contributions to this volume assert that participating in PD (i.e. not free riding) is the 
rational option and that any rational actor will be inevitably compelled to conclude that doing 
his/her part is advantageous. The problem is that reasons for action cannot be equated with 
motivations to act. Akrasia (weakness of the will) is one trivial example why this is so; (fear of) 
relative power gains in international politics – i.e. my gain is another’s loss, and vice versa – is 
another. Only fully idealized actors (see 15.6.1 below) can be expected not only to calculate 
flawlessly what is in their interest but also to consistently act upon it (while we need to assume 
that their individual interest overlaps with common good, i.e., with realization of PD which is an 
unalterable, necessary goal). Recall that conflict among goals, purposes, regimes, or even 
macrosecuritizations is to be expected. How are we to ensure that those issues which urgently 
need our attention, capacities, and resources will be preferentially engaged? One type of answer 
would point to cosmopolitan civic education in existing societies;61 however, convergence of 
school curricula is a touchy issue even in contemporary EU whose member states are 
comparably close as to the cultural beliefs and historical experiences of the respective societies. 
                                                                        
59 Sylvie Bláhová and Pavel Dufek, “Identita v Liberální Politické Teorii a Dilema Kosmopolitismu,” 
Filosofický Časopis 66, no. 3 or 4 (Forthcoming) (2018). 
60 Henri Tajfel et al., “Social Categorization and Intergroup Behaviour,” European Journal of Social 
Psychology 1, no. 2 (1971): 149–78, doi:10.1002/ejsp.2420010202; Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: 
Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion (New York: Pantheon Books, 2012); Joshua Greene, 
Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap Between Them and Us (New York: Penguin Books, 2013); 
Gerald Gaus, “The Open Society and Its Friends,” The Critique January 15 (2017), 
http://www.thecritique.com/articles/open-society-and-its-friends/. 
61 Léa Ypi, “Statist Cosmopolitanism,” Journal of Political Philosophy 16, no. 1 (2008): 55, 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9760.2008.00308.x; Scheuerman, The Realist Case for Global Reform, 106–13; Richard 
Price, “Moral Limit and Possibility in World Politics,” International Organization 62, no. 2 (2008): 206, 
doi:10.1017/S0020818308080132. 
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1.4.5. The constructivist hope and timeframe of change of self-understanding 
I wish to stress that I find the constructivist appeal to malleability of identities and self-
definitions plausible and even convincing as a normative-theoretical position. After all, I have 
myself found refuge in the constructivist camp in my texts.62 The problem with constructivism in 
PD is the urgency of the practical task which does not correspond with the much larger 
timeframe needed for evolutionary transformation of identities: Even Alexander Wendt’s 
famous constructivist argument that a world state is ultimately inevitable (see 15.2.1) assumes a 
fairly long run – Wendt’s initial guess was 100–200 years. So PD-related visions cannot rely on a 
parallel cultivation of cosmopolitan sensibilities, and for the abovementioned reasons, this 
should either weaken the ambitions accordingly, or push towards a different – more realistic, 
paradoxical as it may sound – world-statist perspective. 
1.5. Economics and Finance 
1.5.1. Funding before commercial use of extra-terrestrial resources commences. Global 
taxation 
Funds required for setting up and maintaining an effective system of PD would be 
probably astronomical (pun intended); committed chapters in this volume unfortunately say 
few specific things on that matter, although they include interesting discussion of commercial 
exploitation of space outposts. Although commercial use of new technology or the Moon hub 
certainly provides a plausible idea how to reduce or offset the costs, return on investments will 
not start coming in until after the whole technology is deployed and tested (assuming that 
everything after goes without hitches and according to plan, a bold assumption in matters of 
extra-terrestrial exploration). Until then, either voluntary contributions by involved actors – 
countries, firms, individuals – or specifically targeted tax money need to keep the whole 
enterprise afloat. If my argumentation on public goods provision in 1.3.4 is correct, then relying 
on voluntary contributions is risky: Imagine a successful populist like Donald Trump who thinks 
space exploration, not to say PD, is a complete waste of resources which should be used 
elsewhere (like, say, to boost military budget). Commercial enterprises, on the other hand, can 
go under for numerous reasons (such as, say, wrong investment decisions as regards research, 
development, and production) – and at any rate, it remains to be seen why large businesses 
should care about producing public goods at the expense of increasing profit. Funding of PD 
needs to be continuous and secure, and the firmest source of funding would thus seem to be 
some system of targeted global taxation – each actor paying her share of money each year.63 
Now the question arises, can global tax collection do without global tax collecting corps 
authorized to issue sanctions? I think not, and for sanctions to have any purchase there needs to 
be real possibility of their enforcement, which is doubtful in a weakly centralized system (recent 
experience with human rights protection/enforcement worldwide again provides a sobering 
reminder). Similarly, if the tax money is to remain targeted and not dissolve in completely 
unrelated projects (as is normal with national budgets), some global body would need to make 
sure it is consistently channeled to the desired destination. We have to keep in mind that the 
issue in question is a macrosecuritized, planetary-wide, existential-threat one, and the means of 
dealing with the threat once it materializes are highly destructive weapons whose potential 
abuse, and the ensuing reaction by nuclear powers, invokes the worst nightmares. Under such 
conditions, it seems unreasonable to leave decisions on the allocation of funds to a plurality of 
self-interested actors. The European Union might again serve as an example-analogy: The lesson 
from the debt crisis and particularly the Geek bailout quagmire seems to be that the 
                                                                        
62 Dufek, “Why Strong Moral Cosmopolitanism Requires a World-State”; Pavel Dufek and Michal Mochtak, 
“A Case for Global Democracy? Arms Exports and Conflicting Goals in Democracy Promotion,” Journal of 
International Relations and Development, 2017, doi:10.1057/s41268-017-0114-0. 
63 Global taxation belongs among David Held’s proposals for democratic transformation of the global 
order. See Held, Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities. 
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EU/Eurozone needs a much tighter common fiscal policy, which is just a different term for 
pressures towards further centralization of crucial fiscal as well as monetary decisions. 
1.6. Metatheory 
1.6.1. Ideal theory, full compliance and limits of moral possibility 
PD visions proceed on the level of ideal theory, which means in the present context that, 
first, relevant actors are fully rational and voluntarily comply with the demands and obligations 
placed upon them (see 1.3.4 on collective action problems); and that, second, theoretical visions 
of PD as such are utopian, in the sense that they first construct a desirable world which is in 
relevant respects remarkably different from our own and only then ask whether it is possible to 
achieve it in reality. In order to answer the latter question affirmatively, however, some link 
between idealized actors and their real-world counterparts needs to be provided. 
Methinks that the approach canvassed in this volume underplays the indispensability of 
political agency, that is, the fact that there needs to be a real-world actor or a group of actors 
who are capable of not only making the ideal plan reality, but also of overseeing its long-term 
stability (which includes widespread acceptance, i.e. legitimacy). This is a precondition for both 
effectiveness and a “motivationally sustainable development” of a particular conception of PD 
(this in fact applies to any comparable global political project).64 It is not enough to claim, I tend 
to believe, that the desirable course of action is simply “rational” and “inevitable” for major 
actors, if by that we do not imply some metaphysical notion of historical necessity or causality 
(which would be questionable for separate reasons). Much more needs to be said as to how 
procurement of an ambitious goal such as PD can proceed in a world where (great-)power 
competition, rather than cooperation, arguably still intensifies. 
1.7. Conclusion 
By way of conclusion, let me briefly sum up my argument, and add one generalizing 
remark. I have provided various legal, political, and sociocultural reasons why planetary defense 
against asteroids requires a centralized global political authority, as opposed to a multi-level 
decentralized system of global governance which informs the political-institutional dimension of 
the PD project. I have also explained that democratic legitimacy of any system of supranational 
decision-making represents a tough nut to crack, one that cannot be solved by invoking 
(controversial) normative visions supplied by cosmopolitan-minded political theorists. Both 
these claims are much reinforced by the fact that PD relies on existential-threat 
macrosecuritization. 
If the political-institutional background of PD is anything but self-evident, then PD is 
anything but a done deal, its rational-scientific merits notwithstanding. The message I am trying 
to convey is that the PD community should be more aware of the social and political context of 
their own enterprise, a context which implies that not all good things go together in planetary 
defense. Moreover, to the extent that so-called large technical systems (LTS) provide the 
technological muscle for global governance – and PD infrastructure is a LTS of the highest order 
–, they are enmeshed in the “politics of science and technology” which inevitably accompanies 
any such complex projects.65 
The generalization is this. In diachronic perspective, large technical-political formations 
rarely stick to the initial design, due to both technological advances and socio-political changes. 
While the PD project as outlined in the present volume is strong in incorporating the former 
dimension, it needs in my view to work out its socio-political interface. In the long run, evolution 
beats rational design, and my Wendtian bet is that PD will end up in a world-state (unless the 
                                                                        
64 Although Ypi’s subject matter is global justice, I see no reason why the argument cannot be generalised. 
See Léa Ypi, Global Justice and Avant-Garde Political Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
65 Maximilian Mayer and Michele Acuto, “The Global Governance of Large Technical Systems,” Millennium - 
Journal of International Studies 43, no. 2 (2015): 660–83, doi:10.1177/0305829814561540. 
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asteroid strikes first, which would obviously change the game a bit), a possibility the PD 
community should take more seriously. 
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